Quantum computers will be able to break the currently widespread public-key cryptography (for example RSA or elliptic curve cryptography) in the future and thereby endanger central security mechanisms of digital infrastructures. Currently, sufficiently powerful quantum computers are not yet available. Due to recent advances in the development of quantum computers and on the algorithmic side, leading experts have concluded that the threat will increase significantly in the next ten to 15 years (cf. BSI study "Development Status of Quantum Computers").
In particular, the performance of quantum computers required to break cryptography has, according to scientific findings, dropped dramatically in recent years (cf. Figure 1‑3). While in 2017 around 100 million physical qubits were still considered necessary, calculation models were presented in the current reporting period that consider the presence of only around 11,000 physical qubits to be sufficient.
Thus, the hurdle for a practically usable quantum attack on currently widespread methods such as RSA-2048 or ECC-256 is today significantly lower than just a few years ago. Targets that were long considered "purely theoretical" are therefore increasingly moving into the realm of the possible. This increases the probability that such attacks could become relevant within the lifetime of data that is encrypted today and stored long-term. This is particularly critical for data with a long protection requirement – "store now, decrypt later" (SNDL) – as well as for complex systems such as public key infrastructures (PKI). Thus, attackers can exfiltrate data that they can only exfiltrate encrypted today, store it long-term, and decrypt it in the future using a quantum computer. In this way, they could build up new extortion potential or potential for further cyberattacks with SNDL data.