The activity of APT groups also followed geopolitical tensions in the current reporting period. In addition to North Korean- and Chinese-attributed APT groups, cyber espionage groups that IT security experts attribute to Russia were active in Germany, as in previous reporting periods. These groups have been conspicuous for years with cyber espionage against the political and pre-political sphere (cf. Selected Incidents: Vulnerability: Cyber espionage attacks). Their share was 23 % of the APT groups active in Germany in the current reporting period (cf. Figure 1‑15). The share of Russian-attributed groups was similarly high only in Turkey (25 %) and the United Kingdom (21 %).
While there were still signs of possible prepositioning in Germany in the previous reporting period, the observed activity in the current reporting period was primarily attributable to cyber espionage. Prepositioning refers to the precautionary placement of malicious programs in critical networks in order to be able to carry out sabotage quickly in the event of a conflict. Cyber espionage, on the other hand, primarily aims at information gathering.
Of the APT groups active in Germany, IT security experts attributed 27 % to North Korea. North Korean groups are state-controlled, like cyber espionage groups from other countries, but their attacks serve, in addition to information gathering, primarily the acquisition of foreign currency for the North Korean regime. A further 27 % of the APT groups that were active in Germany in the current reporting period were attributed to China by IT security experts, although a high dark field cannot be ruled out. The Chinese approach of compromising vulnerable perimeter systems from obfuscation networks is difficult to detect and also difficult to attribute to a group. Such attack vectors are observed worldwide (cf. Exploitation Attacks, The State of IT Security in Germany 2025) and have been part of the threat landscape for Germany for years. Despite the military escalation in the Middle East in the second half of the current reporting period, there were only sporadic activities in Germany by APT groups that IT security experts assess as presumably Iranian. These groups spied on persons in Germany during the reporting period who are perceived as enemies by the Iranian regime. The target spectrum of these APT groups includes Iranian-origin opposition members, regime critics, journalists, and persons from the human rights movement as well as women's rights activists. Since Iranian-attributed cyber operations are primarily directed against private end devices and online accounts, a high dark figure in Germany is to be assumed. 9 % of the APT groups active in Germany were attributed to Iran.
Outside Germany, the share of APT actors that IT security experts assess as presumably controlled by Iran was highest in Israel at 65 %. In Saudi Arabia (35 %) as well, the share of APT groups attributed to Iran was the highest. The actors acting against Taiwan, by contrast, were 89 % attributed to China. In India (52 %) and the USA (50 %) as well, the share of cyber espionage groups attributed to China was comparatively high (cf. APT Groups by Target Country and Attribution).
Figure 1‑15: APT groups by target country and attribution
shares in per cent