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Threat Landscape Vulnerability Scanner Trivy Compromised by Supply Chain Attack

The State of IT Security in Germany in 2026

Facts

The open-source vulnerability scanner Trivy from Aqua Security was affected by a supply chain attack in March 2026, which was made possible by the incomplete containment of an earlier incident. Trivy is a scanner that examines, among other things, containers and program libraries for vulnerabilities and the credentials contained therein. The attacker compromised the manufacturer's repository in order to spread new Trivy versions extended with malicious code. The malware in the compromised Trivy versions aimed to steal credentials and other protectable information from the users of the vulnerability scanner Trivy. The malware attempted, among other things, to exfiltrate SSH keys, credentials for cloud service providers, database, Git, and Docker configurations, Kubernetes tokens, or cryptocurrency wallets. The exfiltrated data could be used by the attackers in the future, among other things, to smuggle malware into other repositories or environments. In the course of the incident, the vulnerability was recorded with the identifier CVE-2026-33634 in order to be able to track affected products in the context of the supply chain attack. The vulnerability was assessed as "critical" with 9.4 out of 10 according to the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS), an internationally valid industry standard for assessing the severity of vulnerabilities. According to the manufacturer, the compromise of Trivy affected only open-source components and not the manufacturer's commercial products. The supply chain attack on Trivy is part of a months-long supply chain campaign that, according to media reports, is attributed to the group TeamPCP. Several software ecosystems are now affected by the campaign.

Assessment

Attacks on the supply chain regularly lead to vulnerabilities or compromises of various applications. The possibility for attackers to penetrate a large number of IT systems through the manipulation of packages and libraries makes these attacks an attractive strategy. At the same time, the frequently prevailing uncertainty among the victims about which third-party components are integrated in the IT products used prevents the appropriate protective measures from being taken as soon as compromises of packages and libraries become known.

The group TeamPCP (aka White Dev 258, PCP) first came to attention in December 2025 with an attack campaign. At that time, the actor claimed to have compromised thousands of servers with an exploit. The actor also offered stolen data for sale. TeamPCP acts as an attacker group and as the operator group of the RaaS CipherForce. The actor also operates a Telegram channel through which affiliates are recruited. TeamPCP has so far been characterized by a high adaptability. Thus, in the course of the supply chain attacks, the actor exploited acquired credentials in rapid succession to compromise further projects. In doing so, the actor also expanded the attacks from Linux to Windows systems within a few days and demonstrated a deeper understanding of cloud infrastructure.

Supply chain attacks by TeamPCP at the beginning of 2026 and in the previous year point to a trend: attackers no longer limit themselves to individual projects in supply chain attacks on open-source software. Especially with open-source software that is used in software development or integrated into other projects, a large number of affected parties are frequently recorded.

Response

A sustainable mitigation measure was updating to a secure version. The BSI published an IT security information on the incident with further measures and recommendations. Accordingly, it was to be checked whether Trivy v0.69.4 or other compromised packages had been executed. The credentials associated with them were to be changed and affected program files removed. A list of IoCs, that is, indicators pointing to a compromise, was available on socket.dev (cf. https://socket.dev/blog/trivy-under-attack-again-github-actions-compromise). Basic measures to secure one's own development environments and IT systems were also necessary (cf.  https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/BSI/Publikationen/Broschueren/Management\_Blitzlicht/Management\_Blitzlicht\_C-SCRM.html).