In the current reporting period, the BSI processed 49 reports regarding automotive vehicles. Similar to the previous reporting period, a large proportion of the reports were based on research work or security analyses that had revealed theoretically exploitable vulnerabilities (29% of the reports, cf. Figure 2-15), as well as on vulnerabilities that were proven exploitable (35%). 6% of the vulnerability reports referred to actively exploited vulnerabilities (cf. Figure 2-15).
Figure 2-15: Vehicle-Related Vulnerabilities from July 2025 to June 2026 by Exploitability
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For about 29% of the evaluated vulnerabilities, physical access to the vehicle or the component was necessary to exploit the vulnerability (cf. Figure 2-16), or the component even had to be taken apart (4%). In 14% of the cases, an attack could have been carried out in close proximity (Bluetooth/WLAN); in 22%, the attack would potentially have been possible from a distance via the Internet.
Figure 2-16: Vehicle-Related Vulnerabilities from July 2025 to June 2026 by Possible Attack Path
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Technical Vulnerabilities in the Charging Infrastructure
The BSI, together with the Federal Ministry for Transport, examined the IT security in the public charging infrastructure in the framework of a study. Among other things, relevant vulnerabilities and results from recent hacking competitions were evaluated. With regard to the communication protocols relevant in the charging infrastructure, more than half (21 of 41) of the CVEs considered referred to implementations of the IEC 61850 standard. A further 15 CVEs referred to the Open Charge Point Protocol (OCPP). No CVEs could be assigned to most other protocols.
Weaknesses in Technical and Organizational Standards
The number of known vulnerabilities generally does not correlate with the security level of the respective standard. Standards without known vulnerabilities are therefore not necessarily safer. It is to be assumed that the observed differences result primarily from the fact that hacking competitions such as Pwn2Own give considerable attention to the tested program. In addition, such programs are generally more easily accessible. Other standards and systems have probably simply not yet been examined as intensely. The verification of protocols and corresponding products in their full breadth thus remains an ongoing task.