A quarter of the disruptions of critical infrastructures were attributable to cyberattacks in the current reporting period (cf. Figure 3-17). Since the beginning of 2025, the share of disruptions attributable to physical attacks has also been increasing – most recently to just under 6 % (cf. Figure 3-19).
Figure 3-19: Disruptions of critical facilities by selected causes of disruption
shares in per cent
Cascading effects pose a particular risk. Often, there are interdependencies between different infrastructure sectors, so that a single incident can have effects far beyond the original sector. These mutual dependencies, also referred to as interdependence, can be divided into physical (for example, power supply of data centers), geographic (for example, multiple systems affected by the same natural event), economic (organizational or economic dependencies), or cyber interdependencies (for example, IT systems controlling power grids).
A striking example of cascading effects as a result of physical attacks occurred on January 3, 2026, in Berlin: As a result of an arson attack on a cable bridge, a widespread and long-lasting power outage occurred. Due to damage to a fiber optic cable, the operator could no longer control the power grid. In addition to 45.000 households, four KRITIS operators from the sector Information technology and telecommunications and one KRITIS operator from the sector Transport and traffic were affected. As these were cut off from the power supply, they could not provide their critical services or only partially.
This was already the second widespread power outage in Berlin as a result of an arson attack. As early as September 2025, several tens of thousands of households as well as three KRITIS operators from the sector Information technology and telecommunications, two KRITIS operators from the sector Transport and traffic, and one KRITIS operator from the sector Health were cut off from the power supply.