The variety of attack vectors used for cyber espionage and cyber sabotage in the reporting period was high. In contrast, a vector that was frequently used in the past now plays almost no role at all: With few exceptions, there were no client-side exploits via spear phishing attachments. That is, hardly any e-mail attachments were sent that exploited vulnerabilities in office software. All other vectors were covered by APT groups:
Social engineering has become a relevant method in e-mail-based attacks. A comparatively new phenomenon in this category, which has spread significantly in the current reporting period, is ClickFix, that is, the feigning of tests for filtering automated queries (captchas), with which recipients are to be lured into executing code from the clipboard (cf. Cybercrime Groups). In addition, social engineering through job or contract offers via career portals or professional social networks remains widespread.
Another variant of social engineering, which also does without vulnerabilities, is the method of sending archive files as e-mail attachments. These ZIP or RAR files contain file types that initiate unwanted actions when double-clicked. While shortcut files (with the file extension .lnk) are already established in this context, Program Information Files (with the file extension .pif) and Excel Web Query files (with the file extension .iqy) were also sent in archives together with other, legitimate files in the current reporting period.
Perimeter attacks (that is, attacks on firewalls, VPN servers, and other devices that have direct access to the Internet) are now part of the toolkit of cyber spies, especially with Chinese APT groups. In the reporting period, many of the discovered zero-day exploits (cf. New Vulnerabilities) targeted these systems.
In addition, vulnerabilities in web mailer software such as Zimbra, RoundCube, and Afterlogic Aurora were increasingly exploited via e-mails. This is also an example of the trend toward vulnerabilities in server applications compared to vulnerabilities in office applications. This was observed above all with Russian groups such as APT28, GreenCube, GhostWriter, and WinterVivern, and to a lesser extent with Asian groups such as SunrisePanda.
Cloud environments were frequently compromised through stolen credentials. The later attack phases, in which, among other things, long-term access (persistence) is secured, then mostly took place not through malware, but through legitimate cloud functions or configurations.
In this context, it can be observed that there are specialized teams both in Russian and Belarusian as well as in Asian APT groups that stockpile access. This approach, called "Access Collection," is sometimes mixed with the concept of prepositioning (cf. APT Groups, Cyber Conflict). Above all, when zero-day exploits against perimeter systems are uncovered and published, "compromise first, select later" campaigns are observed. These compromises are (similar to stolen credentials) collected over time and pose a steadily growing threat potential.