Unless otherwise stated, key figures—such as indices, scores, proportional values, or daily averages—are calculated using precise (unrounded) figures and presented as rounded values. Consequently, rounding discrepancies may arise, particularly when data are aggregated.
Unless otherwise specified, the comparison period is the reporting period of the previous year’s report.
Explanation of symbols
f Value has been extrapolated.
. Value is unknown.
- Value is empirically zero (i.e., nothing exists).
0 Value is mathematically zero (i.e., empirically greater than nothing).
X Not applicable/meaningful.
r Value has been corrected compared to previous publications.
/ Value is statistically unreliable and is therefore not reported.
Botnet Monitoring
Objective: The botnet monitoring of the BSI provides insight into the bright field of known infected systems (here: bots) in Germany. In the botnet monitoring, an infected system is any IT system that is infected with malware that integrates the affected IT system into a botnet and makes it remotely controllable. A botnet is a union of multiple infected systems (bots) that can be centrally remotely controlled by one or more control servers (command-and-control servers, short C2) of the attackers and whose computing capacity is available for further attacks. Reports are made about botnets and about bots. Botnets form a central infrastructure for cyberattacks, as attackers bundle the computing power of the compromised devices and misuse it for further attacks. In many cases, botnet structures are also sublet and thus represent a low entry barrier for cybercriminals who do not have their own technical know-how for the building and administration of a botnet. The infection of the target systems usually goes unnoticed. It often happens through malicious programs that are disguised as legitimate applications, or automatically via networks and the Internet – without the active doing of the users. Modern bot software is modularly structured. This allows attackers to specifically load and adjust functions, so that infected systems can be flexibly used for different purposes. The harmful activities are directed either directly against the affected parties, for example through data theft, identity misuse, encryption of data, or cryptomining. Alternatively, the compromised devices are used to attack other systems, for example through network scans, the exploitation of vulnerabilities, DDoS attacks, or the sending of spam. In addition, further malicious programs can be spread, geographic blocks can be bypassed, or illegal content can be retrieved. In some cases, infected devices also automatically generate ad calls in order to unnoticedly load further malicious modules or to commit ad fraud, through which the author of the malware continuously generates revenue. Reporting periods are days, months, and years.
Population: The population of the botnet monitoring is all botnets active in Germany. Infections are not limited to classic computer systems. Rather, in principle, all Internet-capable devices with their own operating system can be affected, such as smartphones, tablets, routers, or IoT devices (smart TVs, set-top boxes, webcams, or digital photo frames).
Sample and Survey Design: The sample of botnets in the monitoring comprises a deliberate selection of the botnets visible in the sinkholing in Germany based on the criterion of size (number of infected systems) or their harmfulness. Within the selected botnets, a bright-field recording of the infected systems (here: bots) visible in the sinkholing takes place. Sinkholes are servers that, in place of the attackers' control servers, receive and log the requests of the infected systems. To this end, both own sinkhole servers and external sinkholing data sources are used to detect infected systems. BSI experts continuously assess the change of known as well as the occurrence of new botnets; new findings are immediately fed into the sample, for example by a new botnet being included in the botnet monitoring.
Scope: The scope of the botnet monitoring extends to the numerically largest botnets in Germany or botnets with high harmful effects. Since these botnets usually infect systems worldwide, data on infections worldwide also exists for the botnets selected for Germany, depending on the type and scope of the own sinkholing measures. However, a systematic selection of the most threatening botnets worldwide does not take place. In addition, systems from targeted attacks on individual institutions and APTs are not included; that is, systems of in particular well-funded affected parties that are, for example, directly damaged by a ransomware attack, as well as targets of cyber espionage. Without the presence of a return channel in the malware in the form of a system addressed by domain name or IP address, no sinkholing can take place.
Quality Assessment: The botnet monitoring comprises the numerically largest as well as smaller but threatening botnets in Germany, for which sinkholing can create visibility and protection for victim systems. There are numerous threatening botnets for which sinkholing cannot be sensibly implemented due to the technical properties. In this case, only the bright field of the infected systems visible in the sinkholing can be recorded. Based on experiences from the shutdown of botnets, it can be assumed that the actual number of infected systems is significantly higher. The background is likely to be that unmaintained IT systems usually do not have only individual vulnerabilities but are comprehensively attackable and can therefore be infected by multiple malicious programs. In the botnet monitoring, then, only that infection is visible that was caused by the observed botnet. In addition, an under-recording of infected systems due to the survey method used is likely to exist. Prominent botnet families, for example, take countermeasures against sinkholing, such as the use of fixed IP addresses, tunneled DNS connections (DNS over HTTPS, DoH), or blockchain techniques, to obscure the communication between control servers and bots. Strong time series breaks can also arise from acutely changing threat situations. As a rule, however, these are due to changes in the C2 infrastructures, i.e., the disappearance or the new inclusion of C2 servers in the sinkholing, or also technical failures and outages. However, a new state of knowledge can also lead to the new inclusion of a botnet in the sinkholing. The number of infected systems then possibly rises suddenly and abruptly.
Cybersecurity Monitor
For the Cybersecurity Monitor, more than 3,000 people aged 16 and over who live in a private household in Germany and have an Internet connection are surveyed annually. In the so-called Computer Assisted Web Interviewing (CAWI), the participants fill out an online survey in a browser. For this purpose, a representative sample is drawn from the Bilendi/respondi online access panel based on the characteristics of age, gender, education, and federal state. The Cybersecurity Monitor can thus represent both comparisons between different groups, such as age groups, and developments over time.
DDoS Statistics
Objective: The DDoS statistics quantify the threat from decentralized denial-of-service attacks (Distributed Denial of Service, DDoS) via web attack surfaces and against targets in Germany. Cyberattacks are recorded that aim to temporarily slow down IT systems or even IT networks, or to take them completely offline, through overload situations caused by the attacker. The statistics are a monthly survey. In addition to the volume of DDoS attacks, the average and maximum bandwidths, the packet rates, and the duration of the attacks are recorded.
Population: all DDoS attacks against targets in Germany
Sample and Survey Design: All DDoS attacks in AS3320 flow into the survey. AS3320 is the autonomous system of Deutsche Telekom AG, one of the largest systems in the German Internet.
Scope: The DDoS statistics quantify the threat situation from DDoS attacks in Germany. A statement about the worldwide threat situation is not thereby enabled.
Quality Assessment: Due to the complete coverage of the DDoS attack events in one of the largest autonomous systems in Germany, the DDoS statistics provide comparatively precise results for the DDoS threat situation in Germany. Targets in other countries are only included sporadically and have no distorting effect..
Data Collection on E-Mail Traffic with the Federal Administration (EBV)
Objective: The survey on e-mail traffic with the Federal Administration reflects the threat situation from mail attack surfaces and incoming e-mail traffic of the Federal Administration. Reports are made about e-mails, spam e-mails, and malware attacks by e-mail on the Federal Administration as well as about the active e-mail addresses as an attack surface for spam and malware e-mails (without authorities that do not participate in the central protection measures of the BSI). Reporting periods are days, months, and years.
Active e-mail addresses are formally valid, exist, are used, and are reachable from the Internet. In addition, they are correctly configured so that they can receive and send e-mails.
Population: The population of the survey is all e-mails that are addressed from the outside to e-mail addresses in the Federal Administration.
Sample and Survey Design: All e-mails flow into the survey that address from the outside an e-mail address of the authorities participating in the protection measures in the Federal Networks, but without e-mail addresses of authorities that do not participate in the central protection measures of the BSI.
Scope: The survey covers the incoming e-mail traffic in the Federal Networks. In addition to general statistical characteristics such as timestamps and sizes of the e-mails, the spam status and statistical information about the e-mail attachments are recorded. The statistics quantify the threat situation of the Federal Administration by spam e-mails, malware spam, and malware attacks by e-mail. A qualitative assessment of the threat situation, for example by individual malware spam campaigns or malware families, is not thereby enabled. An assessment of the threat situation by spam or malware spam is also not possible.
Quality Assessment: The Federal Networks are one of the largest contiguous networks in Germany. The results of statistical surveys in the Federal Networks can therefore regularly be considered as a reflection of the situation in the German networks as a whole. Inconsistencies can, however, arise from the continuously improving detection methods. In addition, slight deviations between the sum of the daily results and the monthly results can arise. They come about due to technically caused different calculation times of the last daily and monthly value.
For the calculation of the key figures, daily aggregates are used. These are the e-mails summed up from 00:00 to 23:59 hours. The daily aggregates flow into the key figure calculation with peak values. When summing up share values or index points, rounding differences can therefore occur.
Data Collection on Phishing Websites (PHW)
Objective: With the survey on phishing websites on the Internet, a part of the infrastructures that attackers use for cyberattacks is recorded. Web pages are recorded with which attackers create deceptively similar known web pages in order, in particular, to collect login credentials or other information. The URL, the IP, and the hostname of the phishing website as well as the industry that is imitated by the phishing website and the language of the phishing website are recorded. Reporting periods are months.
Population: The population is all phishing websites present on the Internet.
Sample and Survey Design: All presumed phishing web pages flow into the sample that the platform openphish.com was able to detect by means of a large-scale analysis of the worldwide Internet. The data is continuously collected by openphish.com, and the sample elements are partly registered to the second.
Scope: Phishing websites are recorded worldwide. The attack campaigns with which attackers distribute the links to their phishing websites are not taken into account.
Quality Assessment: The survey on phishing websites on the Internet can be considered comparatively precise due to the scope of the sample and the quality of the detectors. Nevertheless, the survey on phishing websites on the Internet remains a bright-field statistic; the size of the dark field is unknown. Uncertainties in the time series can arise from continuously improving detectors as well as the automated industry categorization. This requires certain characteristics on a web page that are not always necessarily precisely determinable.
Data Collection on Phishing E-Mails (PhR)
Objective: With the survey on phishing e-mails that German consumers receive, the threat situation of consumers by malicious e-mails is determined. For the statistics, phishing e-mails that reach consumers and that these report to the Phishing Radar of the Consumer Center North Rhine-Westphalia are categorized by which industry is imitated. In doing so, the ongoing consumer reports are aggregated and reported monthly.
Population: all phishing e-mails that reach the mailboxes of the consumers past the protection measures of the providers
Sample and Survey Design: Non-representative sample of presumably harmful e-mails, in particular to German consumers, that are reported to the Phishing Radar of the Consumer Center NRW. For the statistics, the ongoing consumer reports are aggregated monthly.
Scope: The survey on phishing e-mails extends to malicious e-mails against consumers in Germany. No statements about attacker behavior or attacker activities, such as phishing campaigns, are possible. In addition, private e-mail mailboxes are subject to the protection measures of the providers against phishing e-mails. The better the detectors deployed by the providers, the fewer phishing e-mails reach the consumers. Absolute numbers and report volumes are therefore not interpretable. The survey does, however, allow statements about the current phishing e-mails that still reach consumers despite all protection measures and are therefore particularly dangerous.
Quality Assessment: As a reporting statistic, the statement power of the survey is subject to certain limitations. In particular, the reporting path must be known to the affected consumers. The industry categorization is carried out by individual case assessment by subject matter experts of the Consumer Center NRW.
KRITIS Reports (KRM)
Objective: With the KRITIS reports, the threat situation of the critical infrastructures (KRITIS) in Germany under §8b(4) of the Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSIG) as well as of the energy network operators under the Act on Electricity and Gas Supply (EnWG) is recorded. The KRITIS reports comprise reportable disruptions of IT security at KRITIS operators. The causes of disruption as well as the affected sectors, industries, and facilities are recorded.
Operators of critical infrastructures must report the following disruptions immediately to the Federal Office via the contact point (the text is analogous in the EnWG):
- Disruptions of the availability, integrity, authenticity, and confidentiality of their information technology systems, components, or processes that have led to a failure or to a significant impairment of the functionality of the critical infrastructures operated by them,
- Significant disruptions of the availability, integrity, authenticity, and confidentiality of their information technology systems, components, or processes that can lead to a failure or to a significant impairment of the functionality of the critical infrastructures operated by them.
Reports are made quarterly and annually.
Population: The population is all disruptions that have occurred at KRITIS operators (under the KRITIS Ordinance) and energy network operators under the EnWG that have led to a failure of the critical service or could have led to one.
Sample and Survey Design: The operators of critical infrastructures in the sectors water, energy, transport, finance and insurance, information technology and telecommunications, food, and municipal waste disposal are obliged to provide information. Some operators in the finance and insurance sector do not report directly to the BSI; their reports are taken into account for information purposes. All disruptions that have led to a failure of the critical service or could have led to one are reportable.
All reports on occurred disruptions transmitted by KRITIS operators to the BSI or other authorities flow into the sample. This is a bright-field statistic, as there is an unknown dark figure due to possibly unreported disruptions.
Scope: In the reports, KRITIS operators in Germany report the occurred disruptions. Causes of disruption extend not only to cyberattacks but can be a physical damage, technical failure, error by employees, error by third parties, failure of the used infrastructure, a physical attack, or various types of information technology attacks (exploitation of a vulnerability, hacking and manipulation, malicious programs (malware), APT attacks, misuse (insider attack), identity misuse, denial of services).
Quality Assessment: The data quality of the reports received at the BSI is varied, because first, the recorded information is not known to the KRITIS operators in all incidents, and second, the KRITIS operators partly misunderstand the information to be provided and thus possibly fill it in erroneously. This applies in particular to free-text fields. The KRITIS specialist area plausibilizes reports in a subsequent step and supplements missing information. Nevertheless, deviations are possible in individual cases. In addition, an unknown dark figure of possibly unreported disruptions is to be assumed.
KRITIS Proofs of Compliance (KRN)
Objective: The statistics represent the results of the independent examinations of KRITIS operators under §39(3) BSIG and thus the resilience of the critical infrastructures in Germany. With these examinations, proof-obligated KRITIS operators must have the maturity levels of their prevention, defense, and management systems assessed by independent auditors in a two-year cycle. Reports are made about the sectors, the maturity levels of the information security management systems (ISMS), the intrusion detection systems (SzA), as well as the business continuity management systems (BCMS).
Reporting periods are quarters.
Population: all proof-obligated German KRITIS operators under the KRITIS Ordinance
Sample and Survey Design: Around 730 KRITIS operators in Germany who are proof-obligated towards the BSI flow into the full survey. Not all KRITIS operators are proof-obligated towards the BSI. Some energy-sector operators are proof-obligated under §11(1f) EnWG. These proofs contain implementation levels of the intrusion detection systems, but no ISMS/BCMS maturity levels. Finally, recently registered operators, for example in the sector municipal waste disposal, must only submit a proof two years after registration.
The examinations are carried out by external, trained auditors who are commissioned by the KRITIS operators. The proofs are collected according to the guidelines of the BSI and evaluated quarterly with reference to the reference date.
Scope: The reporting statistic on the KRITIS proofs extends to the KRITIS operators who are proof-obligated towards the BSI. Statements about other KRITIS operators are not possible.
Quality Assessment: Since the proofs are collected by trained auditors, they can be considered comparatively good. The KRITIS specialist area continuously works on ensuring that the proofs meet the necessary high standards.
Leak Victims Statistics (LKS)
Objective: The Leak Victims Statistics quantify a part of the types of impact that ransomware attacks in connection with data leaks or exploitation attacks in connection with data leaks have. In this way, attackers loot data from victims. Subsequently, they threaten to publish the looted data on so-called leak sites if the damaged institution does not pay the demanded ransom.
The various cybercriminal attacker groups usually set up specific leak sites for the publication of the data of those victims who have not paid a ransom. The data can be downloaded by other cybercriminals there or occasionally bought and misused for further attacks.
The Leak Victims Statistics count the mentions of new victims of data leaks on these leak sites. Reports are not made about attacks, but about the number of victims named by the attackers on the leak sites operated by them, who are thereby extorted.
Reports are also made about the leak sites and the activity of the respective attacker groups that operate the sites. The reporting period is quarters.
Population: The population of the Leak Victims Statistics is all damaged companies, authorities, and other institutions of data leaks that originate from cybercrime attacks and that were named by attackers on dedicated leak sites. Leaks that are traded by attackers among themselves outside of leak sites or distributed on underground forums and marketplaces are not covered by this statistics.
Sample and Survey Design: All new victims flow into the survey that have become known to the BSI from detections by data service providers, from reports of victims, or from public sources. The Leak Victims Statistics is a full survey on the known leak victims. The Leak Victims Statistics is collected quarterly. All new victims are counted at the point in time at which they become known through mention on the leak sites of the attackers. Therefore, no duplicates from previous quarters are included in a reporting period.
Scope: The Leak Victims Statistics does not allow statements about ransomware attacks or attacks against new vulnerabilities. The attacks are not counted, but the victims. If an attack affects multiple victims (e.g., as a result of an attack on an IT service provider that led to the extortion of various further victims), all victims are counted, provided they are named on leak sites. The statistics reflect the set of (presumably) unwilling-to-pay victims worldwide who were named on leak sites. Victims who have paid or were not named for other reasons are not taken into account. Victims are also counted as leak victims in cases where no ransomware was used, but whose data was directly exfiltrated after an exploitation attack.
Quality Assessment: Due to the high worldwide coverage by the data service providers, the Leak Victims Statistics can be considered comparatively accurate. This is also shown by the expectedly high share of duplicates (>50%) between the various data sources. Duplicates are cleaned up. Double counting does not take place. The Leak Victims Statistics is nevertheless to be considered a bright-field statistic. Extortion victims who are named on underground forums are not included. However, individual cases may be included in which attackers merely claimed to have carried out an attack and attempted an extortion without there actually being a data outflow.
Leak Statistics (DLK)
Objective: With the Leak Statistics, the BSI records publicly known data leaks with consumer affectedness.
Population: all publicly known data leaks with consumer affectedness
Sample and Survey Design: For the Leak Statistics, a selection of publicly known data leaks stratified by affected industries is collected by means of continuous, automated web scraping.
Quality: The Leak Statistics is a bright-field statistic. The automated industry categorization requires certain characteristics on an affected website that are not always precisely determinable, which results in an indeterminable dark figure.
Malware Statistics (MWS)
Objective: The Malware Statistics represents the state and development of the newly known malware volume on the Internet. In addition, new variants of potentially unwanted applications (PUA) are recorded. Reports are not made about attacks with malware, but about the known malware volume in total. Reporting periods are months and quarters.
Population: The population of the Malware Statistics is all programs available on the Internet that can perform harmful operations, including such programs that enable other programs to perform harmful operations (e.g., loader software). Not included are URLs through which such programs are downloaded; included are the programs to be downloaded. A variant of a malware is any copy of this malware that has been modified, even slightly. In contrast to new malware, new variants of already known malware do not have new functionalities. However, variants are unique with regard to the resulting hash value.
Sample and Survey Design: The Malware Statistics comprises programs that can perform harmful operations or enable other programs to do so. The type of malware as well as the platform and format are recorded, among other things. In addition, new variants of potentially unwanted applications (PUA) are recorded. Since each new malware variant represents a threat in the sense that it can be used for attacks, the statistics quantifies the threat situation by new malware.
Scope: The Malware Statistics comprises programs that can perform harmful operations or enable other programs to do so. The type of malware as well as the platform and format are recorded, among other things. In addition, new PUA variants are recorded. Since each new malware variant represents a threat in the sense that it can be used for attacks, the statistics quantifies the threat situation by new malware. The calculated indicators are early warning indicators for cyberattacks, as more new malware variants will also lead to more attacks with these new variants. The probability of malware attacks thus increases with the quantity of new malware variants, although there does not have to be a temporal connection between the occurrence of new variants and attacks. Conversely, a decrease in the indicators does not always mean a relaxation of the threat situation, as the production of new variants may have decreased because the attackers successfully achieve their goals with the existing variants and the production of new variants is therefore not necessary. A qualitative assessment of the threat in the sense of a weighting by the spread or damage potential of a malware is not enabled by the Malware Statistics. Statements about attacks with malware are also not possible.
Quality Assessment: The results of the Malware Statistics can be considered comparatively accurate due to the scope and the update concept of the underlying databases. Since no findings about the dark field of unknown malware are available, however, this applies only to the bright field of newly known malware that is actually recorded in the statistics. Inconsistencies can arise from the continuously improving methods of malware detection, in particular of the virus scanners. These are largely caught by standardized revisions. However, since the revision cycles comprise at most one and a half quarters, it can be assumed that older reporting periods tend to slightly underestimate the actual malware volume. In March 2023, the Malware Statistics was extensively revised. Changes to the data set that were due to improved detection methods have been taken into account retroactively. Therefore, the frequencies shown for periods before March 2023 may differ from earlier reports on these periods.
Vulnerability Statistics (SSS)
Objective: The Vulnerability Statistics represents the state and development of the newly known vulnerabilities in IT products. It thereby enables statements about the known, vulnerable attack surface of the worldwide IT landscape for cyberattacks. Vulnerabilities that were still unknown to manufacturers and users at the time of their first exploitation (zero days) are not included. In addition to the type and quantity of the newly known vulnerabilities, their severity according to the CVSS base score 3.1 is recorded. The evaluation includes the identification of vulnerabilities in systems of artificial intelligence (AI). Reporting periods are years and quarters.
Population: The population is all vulnerabilities in IT products that have newly become known in the reporting period.
Sample and Survey Design: The Vulnerability Statistics is a survey based on the US National Vulnerability Database (NVD), the CVE Program (CVE® Record Information, cvelistV5) of the MITRE Corporation (MITRE), as well as the European Vulnerability Database (EUVD) of the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA). Vulnerabilities that were rejected by the NVD or the official CVE list of MITRE due to too low a spread of the affected system do not flow into the statistics. In addition, no vulnerabilities without a publication date and no vulnerabilities that are not registered in the NVD are taken into account. In February 2025, the statistics was subjected to a comprehensive revision. Since then, vulnerabilities without a rating are also taken into account.
The Vulnerability Statistics is a quarterly statistic; the survey takes place in the middle of the following quarter. Vulnerabilities that become known later are taken into account in revisions.
Scope: The Vulnerability Statistics is a reporting statistic based on the vulnerabilities that are reported worldwide to the NVD. Zero-day vulnerabilities that were still unknown at the time of the first exploitation are not included. In addition, only the newly known vulnerabilities are recorded. Statements about their actual exploitation for cyberattacks are not thereby enabled. In addition, the IT products in which the vulnerabilities occurred are known. However, information about their spread in the worldwide IT landscape is not available. AI-specific attack vectors such as data poisoning or evasion are not systematically recorded by the primary sources – the actual AI-specific attack surface is therefore structurally underestimated.
Weaknesses (in English: weaknesses) in individual IT products are states in a software, firmware, hardware, or service component that, under certain circumstances, can contribute to the creation of vulnerabilities. Weaknesses are generated in many cases by developers during product development. Although developers apply very different programming practices, they can all generate the same types of weaknesses that lead to vulnerabilities in their own products. The CWE list of MITRE as well as the associated taxonomies and classification schemes serve as a language for the identification and description of these weaknesses in the form of CWE IDs. The Vulnerability Statistics therefore enables statements about the underlying weaknesses that have led to the known attack surface for cyberattacks.
Quality Assessment: Due to the scope of the underlying raw data collection (NVD), the Vulnerability Statistics is likely to represent the best possible quantification of the known, vulnerable attack surface of the worldwide IT landscape. The Vulnerability Statistics is a reference-date survey. In this respect, the state of information as of the reference date is reflected. Information that arrives later in the NVD is taken into account in revisions. For the evaluation of vulnerabilities with an AI connection, it should be considered that the machine classification can be erroneous in individual cases. In addition, disclosure practices and publication waves of individual manufacturers influence the absolute number of vulnerabilities.
The Vulnerability Statistics is revised at irregular intervals – for example, when the reporting practice of the worldwide IT security community has changed in a statistically relevant way. This was the case, for example, in 2024, when changes in the reporting policies of the Linux kernel developers caused breaks in the time series. The statistics was therefore extensively revised in mid-February 2025, i.e., for the first time for the reporting period fourth quarter 2024. Comparisons with previously published reports are therefore only possible to a limited extent.
CVE® is a registered trademark of the MITRE Corporation; CVE content is used in accordance with the CVE Program Terms of Use.
Threat Actors Statistics (TAS)
Objective: The Threat Actors Statistics records the structural information about the threat situation by cyberattackers that is known to Western cybersecurity experts. Reports are made about APT, cybercrime, and hacktivist groups. The statistics reflects, for example, characteristics such as the countries of origin, the target countries, the target sectors, as well as the malware used. Reports are made semi-annually.
Population: The population is all attacker groups relevant to the Western world.
Sample and Survey Design: The Threat Actors Statistics is a semi-annual reference-date survey with the cybersecurity experts of the IT security service provider CrowdStrike. The data basis is the sensorics of CrowdStrike/Falcon, which is enriched by the experts with qualitative information in laborious analyses. The Threat Actors Statistics is a reference-date survey that reflects the state of information as of 30 June and 31 December.
Scope: With the Threat Actors Statistics, structural information about the threat situation by attacker groups for the Western world is recorded. Statements about actual attacks are not thereby possible. In addition, attacker groups that are relevant to the Western world are observed with priority. Attacker groups that exclusively threaten other parts of the world are not taken into account.
Quality Assessment: The structural information collected with the Threat Actors Statistics reflects, with reference to the reference date, the quantifiable state of information of Western cybersecurity experts about the threat to the Western world by attacker groups. Statements about the worldwide threat situation are not thereby possible. Qualitative statements about the threat situation by cybercrime, espionage, and sabotage that would, for example, take into account the extent of current activity are also not possible.
Web Attack Surface Measurement (WAM)
Objective: The Web Attack Surface Measurement quantifies the attack surface of Germany for cyberattacks on the Internet. The reachable .de domains as well as the information available on the web for these, such as associated IP addresses, hosts, exposure, and the availability of sensitive metadata that enables the finding of vulnerabilities, are recorded with reference to the reference date. An increase in the infrastructure-related indicators means a growth of the attack surface simply due to the fact that more and more services are being provided on the network. A change in the risk-related indicators, on the other hand, measures to what extent technical standards are met in the sense of basic principles of cybersecurity.
Population: All known second-level .de domains registered in Germany on the Internet with the structure "domain name" + ".de," such as "bundesregierung.de."
Sample and Survey Design: In the first quarter of 2026, around 80% of all 17.86 million .de domains registered with DENIC are in the sample. The sample has grown from 13.2 million to up to 14.04 million domains since its first collection in the second quarter of 2025. The goal is a full survey. Each domain belongs to an organizational unit in the network, a so-called network block, which is provided with a number (ASN number). For the survey, both freely available and the data of various service providers for domain reconnaissance are used; the enrichment of the domains with metadata is also carried out by the retrieval of freely available services as well as relevant data providers, for example of geoinformation – these provide an approximate indication for a network block of where the IP address to which the domain belongs is actually geographically located –, information on hosters, and Internet metadata. The information collected for the web attack surface is – apart from the domain reconnaissance – freely available for individual domains and IP addresses, but not freely available across the board.
The sample design consists of the continuous domain reconnaissance, i.e., known domains are continuously collected. These are regularly checked for their reachability and enriched accordingly. The aggregation of the data takes place at the quarterly level, i.e., all domains that were reachable in the corresponding quarter are represented.
Scope: The Web Attack Surface Measurement comprises public but not freely accessible across-the-board information. Through the recording of the predominant share of existing .de domains and the possibility to reconcile against the total quantity of .de domains, a large part of the web attack surface of Germany is recorded. Not included are domains and IPs that are assigned a different ending than .de, such as .com or .org.
Quality Assessment: Due to the scope of the sample, the Web Attack Surface Measurement allows highly precise statements about the .de domains on the Internet.
Activity Level Statistics (ANS)
Objective: The Activity Level Statistics (ANS) capture the threat landscape posed by cyber espionage and cyber crime attacks as known to western cybersecurity experts. Reporting is provided quarterly in summary form on the volume of cyber espionage and cyber crime attacks carried out by threat actor groups relevant to the western world.
Population: The population comprises all cyber espionage and cyber crime attacks worldwide carried out during the quarter by threat actor groups relevant to the western world.
Sample and data collection design: Included are all cyber espionage and cyber crime attacks that the IT security services company CrowdStrike detects and analyses using its own sensor technology within its customers' networks. Individual sensor hits are aggregated into attacks, which are then summed on a quarterly basis.
Coverage: The Activity Level Statistics capture summary structural information on the threat landscape posed by cyber espionage and cyber crime attacks for the western world. Statements about individual attacks on individual organisations are not possible on this basis. Nor is it possible to draw conclusions about individual networks protected by CrowdStrike. In addition, the focus is primarily on threat actor groups that are relevant to the western world. Attacks by threat actor groups that are active exclusively against other parts of the world are therefore not taken into account.
Quality: The Activity Level Statistics show the long-term development of the volume of cyber espionage and cyber crime attacks in the western world. Regular comparisons with summary figures from other IT security services companies as well as with data from law enforcement agencies in the western world confirm that the volume and development of these attacks are depicted plausibly. The statistics can therefore provide representative statements about the development of these attack figures, but not about their absolute magnitudes.
Exploitation Statistics (MCF)
Objective: The Exploitation Statistics capture the traffic with which attackers address IP addresses en masse and without specific target in order to carry out attacks on IT systems by exploiting vulnerabilities, for instance in order to encrypt or exfiltrate data there. Reporting covers executed exploitation attacks. Reporting periods are months.
Population: The population of the Exploitation Statistics is the traffic on the internet that attackers generate for the purpose of carrying out exploitation attacks.
Sample and data collection design: The sample for the Exploitation Statistics is collected using a low-interaction, honeypot-like cyber threat detection suite.
Coverage: The Exploitation Statistics reflect the traffic on the internet that addresses IP addresses on a broad, area-wide basis. Because the honeypot system consists of individual sensors, the results can be used to assess trends, but not to extrapolate to data volumes of specific organisations, countries, regions or institutions.
Quality assessment: All traffic received at the IP addresses of the sensor system is included in the statistics. Although with a high degree of probability the observed traffic data constitutes attack traffic, this cannot always be established beyond doubt. For example, port scans can also be conducted by IT security companies or IT security researchers who behave like attackers in order to test systems or find vulnerabilities. The extent of any biases thereby caused is unknown, but is not expected to have a noteworthy impact on the statistical trends, since they are consistently factored into the data collection and the conditions of data collection therefore remain constant.
Port Scan Statistics (MCS)
Objective: The Port Scan Statistics capture the threat landscape posed by attacker traffic on the internet. Included is the traffic with which attackers address IP addresses en masse and without specific target in order to find vulnerabilities and prepare attacks. So-called port scans provide attackers with reconnaissance about which services are offered in a network such as the internet and are available on the target system. Reporting therefore covers port scans used for attack preparation. Reporting periods are months.
Population: The population of the Port Scan Statistics is the traffic on the internet that attackers generate through port scans.
Sample and data collection design: The sample for the Port Scan Statistics is collected using a low-interaction, honeypot-like cyber threat detection suite.
Coverage: The Port Scan Statistics reflect the traffic on the internet that addresses IP addresses on a broad, area-wide basis — for instance through scanning services or systems used for the preparation of attacks. Because the honeypot system consists of individual sensors, the results can be used to assess trends, but not to extrapolate to data volumes of specific organisations, countries, regions or institutions.
Quality assessment: All traffic received at the IP addresses of the sensor system is included in the statistics. Although with a high degree of probability the observed traffic data constitutes attacker activity, this cannot always be established beyond doubt. For example, port scans can also be conducted by IT security companies or IT security researchers who behave like attackers in order to test systems or find vulnerabilities. The extent of any biases thereby caused is unknown, but is not expected to have a noteworthy impact on the statistical trends, since they are consistently factored into the data collection and the conditions of data collection therefore remain constant.